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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Police Power-Intoxicating Liquors.-Plaintiffs were
in an automobile when another car, operated by an intoxicated driver, collided
with plaintiffs' automobile, causing property damage and severe personal injuries. The intoxicated driver had recently left defendant's tavern, where, while
in an intoxicated condition, he had been sold beer by defendant. Plaintiffs
brought this action against defendant tavern owner under the Connecticut
Dram Shop Act, and were awarded a substantial verdict by the jury. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Errors, held, one justice dissenting, affirmed.
The Connecticut statute is a constitutional exercise of police power although
it does not require proof of causation between the sale of the intoxicating
liquor and the injury brought about by the intoxication. Pierce v. Albanese,
Conn. -,
129 A.2d 606 (1957).
In the absence of statute, no cause of action exists against the vendor of
intoxicating liquors in favor of the person injured as a result of the intoxication of the vendee.' The common law generally denies relief in such a case
because the sale is not considered the proximate cause of the injury.2 The
legislatures of many states, however, have supplied remedies for the injured
parties, known as "civil damage laws" or "dram shop acts."3 These statutes
create a right of action against the vendor of intoxicating liquor in favor of
the one injured as a consequence of the intoxication of the vendee. 4 While it
has been said that such acts are penal in nature and should be strictly construed,5 they have generally received the liberal construction given to remedial statutes.6
The Connecticut statute provides: "If any person ...
shall sell any alcoholic liquor to an intoxicated person, and such purchaser, in consequence of
such intoxication, shall thereafter injure the person or property of another,
such seller shall pay just damages to the person injured. . .. ,,7 The statutes
of other jurisdictions generally require proof that the sale was a contributing
cause of the intoxication, s but the statute in question obviates the necessity
of such proof. ° The question presented to the court in the instant case, there1. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Coy v. Cutting, 138 Kan. 109,
23 P.2d 458 (1933); Kraus v. Schroeder, 105 Neb. 809, 182 N.W. 364 (1921); Healey v.
Cady, 104 Vt. 463, 161 At]. 151 (1932).
2. Lammers v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 186 Cal. 379, 199 Pac. 523 (1921).
3. Ark., Colo., Conn., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Me., Mass., Mich., Neb., N.H.,
N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis.
4. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 436.22 (1948); N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 16.
5. Cruse v. Aden 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
6. Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949); Buckmaster v. McElroy,
20 Neb. 557, 31 N.W. 76 (1887); Mead v. Stratton, 87 N.Y. 493 (1882).
7. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4307 (Supp. 1955).
8. Baker v. Summers, 201 Ill. 52, 66 N.E. 302 (1903); Jones v. Bates, 26 Neb. 693,
42 N.W. 751 (1889); N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 16.
9. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Duryea, 143 Conn. 53, 119 A.2d 325

(1955).
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fore, was whether the imposition of liability without proof of causation between the sale and the injury was a valid exercise of the police power of the
legislature.
The police power of the states, a broad power with infinite potential, has
defied exact and particular definition. One of the earliest as well as the most
satisfactory definitions is that given in Massachusetts v. Alger,'0 where the
..the power vested in the legislature by the
police power was defined as
constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.' 1L
The legislative discretion is very broad both in determining what the interests of the public require and what measures are reasonably necessary for the
protection of such interests.'12 To be sure, there are constitutional limitations
but these limitations are satisfied if, first, the statute is designed to accomplish a purpose properly falling within the scope of the police power,13 and
necessary and appropriate for
secondly, the means adopted are reasonably
4
the accomplishment of that objective.1
Traffic in liquor has always been considered a proper subject for legislation. In Thurlow v. Massachusetts1r it was said: "It is not necessary . . . to
array the appalling statistics of misery, pauperism, and crime which have their
origin in the use or abuse of ardent spirits. The police power .. .is alone
competent to the correction of these great evils, and all measures of restraint
the scope of that auor prohibition necessary to effect the purpose are within
7
thority."'16 This judicial attitude has not waivered.1
The defendant in the present case objected not to legislative control but to
the particular manner in which the legislature exercised its control, because
the statute imposed liability irrespective of any causal relation between the
sale of the intoxicating liquor and the injury suffered by the plaintiffs.' 0
".

10. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1351).
11. Id. at 85.
12. Stephenson v. Binford, 2S7 US. 251 (1932); Sterling
(1932); Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Ct., 214 Cal. 668, 3
Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 At. 240 (1928), aff'd, 2S0 U.S.
144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934); Adamec v. Post,
castro, 356 I11.

v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378
P.2d 140 (1932); Silver %r.
117 (1929); People v. Bel273 N.Y. 250, 7 N.E2d 120

(1937).
13. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 US. 225 (1911); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illlnois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561 (1905).
282, 146 N.E.
14. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 US. 60 (1917); People v. Witte, 315 Ill.
178 (1925).
15. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
16. Id. at 631.
17. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.. 623 (ISS7); Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.. 304 (1917);
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 303 U.S. 132 (1939).
18. Generally, liability without fault cannot be imposed: Birmingham Mineral R.R.
v. Parsons, 100 Ala. 662, 13 So. 602 (1893); Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 140
N.W. 615 (1913); Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). But
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In view of the grave danger to the public attendant on the sale of alcohol
to intoxicated persons, especially where automobiles are involved, the court in
the instant case decided that the means adopted by the legislature were fairly designed to accomplish the purpose of the statute. Actual proof that the
sale contributed to the intoxication was not required because ". . . the legislature reasonably could find that in the great variety of factual situations encompassed by the terms of § 4307 there would always be such a reasonable
relationship between a sale in violation of the law and the injury consequent
upon the intoxication of the one to whom the sale was made as would warrant a departure from common-law concepts of proximate causation and the
substitution of a new basis of liability.' 0
The defendant argued further that under this interpretation of the statute
liability would be imposed on the seller of intoxicating liquor even where the
particular liquors sold in no way contributed to the intoxication. To this
situation the court again applied the test of reasonableness. Stressing the fact
that the seller of alcoholic liquors is a permittee, the court said that it would
not be unreasonable to provide that one who violated the law by selling liquor
to an intoxicated person would not be heard to say that the particular drink
sold did not cause or contribute to the intoxication.
The court concluded that the statute met the test of validity of the legislative exercise of the police power of the state: ". . . in the light of the mischief
sought to be suppressed and the remedy sought to be accorded, § 4307 is not
arbitrary or unreasonable ....-20
The dissenting opinion took issue with the majority on the reasonableness
of the means adopted by the legislature. It conceded the power of the legislature to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquor, but said that the statute should
be declared invalid because the penalty it imposed was oppressive. The dissent in support of its argument set forth the pecuniary disproportion between
the act committed by the defendant and the penalty he was forced to pay.
The term "penalty" is commonly used as meaning an extraordinary liability to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person wronged,
such liability not being limited to the damages suffered. 21 The test for determining the validity of penalties is, as stated by the dissenting opinion, whether
they are severe and excessive. 22 Admittedly, under the application of this rule
to the instant case, a strong argument could be made against the validity of
this statute.
circumstances may warrant a departure from this principle: New York Central R.R. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911); East Grand Forks
v. Luck, 97 Minn. 373, 107 N.W. 393 (1906).
19. Pierce v. Albanese, - Conn. -, -, 129 A.2d 606, 612 (1957).
20. Id. at -, 129 A.2d at 613 (1957).
21. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914); Miller v. Municipal Ct., 22 Cal. 2d 818,
142 P.2d 297 (1943).
22. Life & Cas. Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934); Superior Laundry Co. v. Rose,
193 Ind. 138, 137 N.E. 761 (1923).
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But while civil damage laws have an incidental penal aspect,- they are considered as primarily remedial in character 4 designed to compensate rather
than to punish. The fundamental principle with regard to damages is that the
one injured shall have fair and just compensation equal to the loss sustained
as a result of defendant's wrongful act.2 Accordingly, damages must be calculated on the basis of plaintiff's loss. 2 0 While this statute has the incidental aspect of enforcing compliance with a penal statute, the primary purpose is to provide a civil remedy. From this proper viewpoint of compensation, the majority found that the amount of the verdict was not excessive.
The decision of the Connecticut court is quite orthodox. Faced with the
problem of protecting the rights of individuals from unwarranted encroachment by the legislature, the opinion solves the question by application of judicial precedent to the new social policy of the legislature. The court measures
the object and means of the statute against the standard of reasonableness
demanded by courts for a valid exercise of police power. Since the statute is
found to comply with this test, the court is bound to respect the discretion
of the legislature and give effect to its intent.
Corporations-Authority of Officer To Bring Suit Without Consent of the
Board of Directors.-The secretary-treasurer of a small closely-held business
corporation instituted an action in the corporate name for the conversion of
certain sample merchandise. At the time of suit, the corporation was in the
process of dissolution. The president had retired from active participation in
the business, and the secretary-treasurer was left in complete control of its
management. On two occasions subsequent to the president's withdrawal the
secretary-treasurer employed counsel to defend actions against the corporation without any objection from the president or board of directors. The
four-man board of directors consisted of the president, the secretary-treasurer,
and their wives. The corporate by-laws vested in the board of directors the
control and general management of the business. However, the board never
convened, and prior to the agreement to dissolve the corporation the two
officers acted with equal authority. Defendants moved to vacate service of
the summons and complaint, asserting that the by-laws required the consent
of the majority of the board of directors before an action could be instituted.
The appellate division affirmed an order of special term denying the motion.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, held, judgment affirmed. An officer of a
close corporation has implied authority to institute actions in the corporate
name where he has assumed the control and general management of the busi23.

See note 5 supra.

24. See note 6 supra.
25. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243 (1924); Ball v. T. J. Pardy Constr. Co., 103
Conn. 549, 143 AtI. 855 (192S); J. B. Preston Co. v. Funhouser, 261 N.Y. 140, 124
NE. 737, aff'd, 290 U.S. 163 (1933).
26. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tailored Woman, Inc., 283 App. Div. 173, 126 N.Y.S.2d
573 (lst Dep't 1953).
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ness of the corporation. Rothman & Schneider, Inc. v. Beckerman, 2 N.Y.2d
493, 141 N.E.2d 610 (1957).
The management and control of a corporation's affairs ordinarily rest in its
board of directors.' The officers of a corporation are merely the board's
agents, and are generally appointed and controlled by it.2 An officer, in addition to the prima facie authority 3 vested in him by virtue of his office, may
also be granted express authority by resolution of the directors or by provision in the by-laws, 4 or implied authority by acquiescence of the board of
directors in a general course of conduct.5
Where a corporation is a party defendant, the executive head has prima
facie authority to defend the action without a formal vote of authorization
of the board of directors, since the defense of an action is rarely a matter of
discretion, and the delay in obtaining such authorization could result in a
judgment by default.6 However, such discretion is required where the instituofficer
tion of an, action in the corporate name is involved, and the executive
7
does not have prima facie authority to institute a corporate action.
The problem of a corporate officer's authority to institute suit in the name
of the corporation without the consent of the board of directors was first considered by the New York Court of Appeals in Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball
Bearing Pen Corp.8 There the president, a director of the plaintiff corporation, called a meeting of the company's board of directors to consider the
advisability of bringing suit. The by-laws provided that the act of a majority
of the entire board of directors constituted the act of the board of directors.
The board deadlocked and the president took it upon himself to institute the
corporate action. It was held that under the circumstances he had no implied
authority to commence such an action, since there was an express denial of
authority.9 It is submitted, however, that the president would not have had
1. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 27.
2. Ballantine, Corporations § 49 (1946).
3. Prima fade, or presumptive authority, is that authority usually exercised by an
officer of a corporation strictly by virtue of his office. See Annot., 10 A.L.R,2d 705-06

(1950).
4.

N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 60 provides: "The directors . . .may appoint

. . .

officers

.. who shall respectively have such powers and perform such duties in the management of the property and affairs of the corporation, subject to the control of the directors, as may be prescribed by them or in the by-laws."
5.

19 C.J.S., Corporations § 1043 (1940).

6. Regal Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Merlis, 274 Fed. 915 (2d Cir. 1921); Beebe v.
George H. Beebe Co., 64 N.J.L. 497, 46 Atl. 168 (Sup. Ct. 1900); Application of Bern.
heimer, 43 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 868, 43 N.Y.S.2d 277
(2d Dep't 1943).
7. Ney v. Eastern Iowa Tel. Co., 162 Iowa 525, 144 N.W. 383 (1913); Jeanerette Rico
& Milling Co. v. Durocher, 123 La. 160, 48 So. 780 (1909); Legion Against Vivisection,

Inc. v. Grey, 63 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
8. 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790 (1949).
9. However, the court pointed out that the appropriate remedy under the facts of the
case was a stockholder's derivative action. 298 N.Y. at 493, 84 N.E.2d at 794.

1957]

CASE NOTES

implied authority to institute suit even if there were no direct prohibition by
the board of directors, since the decision to take such action rested squarely
within the managerial powers of the board of directors which was actively in
control of the management of the corporation. Mloreover, since the president
had not instituted suit previously with either the expressed or tacit assent
of the board, there was no prior course of conduct by which the authority
of the president could be implied.
In the instant case, however, the secretary-treasurer, by virtue of his management of the plaintiff's corporate business, was vested with implied authority to bring such an action. In making other discretionary decisions relating to the corporation's affairs, he had not referred to the board of directors,
but had conducted its affairs without intervention. The court pointed out
that the secretary-treasurer ". . . was for all intents and purposes its general
manager and executive head . . . with full knowledge and acquiescence
of the other stockholders and directors."' 0 He, therefore, possessed the discretionary power usually found in the board of directors, which in this case
had ceased to function."
The court pointed out that the action in the instant case was brought
against one who was a stranger to the corporation, whereas in the Stcrling case
the defendants were "insiders." This distinction seems irrelevant under th'e
facts of the instant case, since the implied authority of the secretary-treasurer
arose from a general course of business, which gave him the right to commence
litigation regardless of the defendant's identity,.
Judge Frank, who dissented in the appellate division, based his opinion
upon the reasoning of Voron anzd Clait, In. v. Benguiat,13 where it was held
that a suit brought in the name of the corporation by its secretary-treasurer
was unauthorized. That case is quite distinguishable from the principal case,
since there the corporation's president took an active part as the executive
head of the company. The law is well-settled in New York that any officer
who is entrusted with the general management of a corporation will be looked
upon as its executive head, and will have such powers as those ordinarily
possessed by the president regardless of the title14he bears, since the inference
of authority is to be drawn from the acts done.
The lower court held that the situation was one which vitally affected the
10. Rothman & Schneider, Inc. v. Beckerman, 2 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 141 N.E2d 610,
613 (1957).
11. In many dosely-held corporations the requirement of formal board action ceases
to be material when informal "partnership management" is adopted with approval of all
stockholders. Stevens, Corporations § 146 (2d ed. 1949).
12. The implied authority of the officer, ipso facto, permits the bringing of suits
against any party. If an "insider" could prevent such action, the implied authority would
be dissipated.
13. 162 N.Y. Supp. 974 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
14. Barkin Constr. Co. v. Goodman, 221 N.Y. 156, 161, 116 N.E. 770, 771 (1917);
Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co., 143 N.Y. 430, 38 N.E. 461 (1894). Cf. Hastings v.
Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.Y. 473, 479, 34 N.E. 288, 291 (1893).
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interests of the corporation, and that the existence of such emergency gave
the secretary-treasurer implied authority to act.15 This position, a tenuous
one in the light of the impending dissolution, was not adopted by the Court
of Appeals. However, the rule that the existence of a situation which threatens corporate existence impliedly authorizes the president to institute corporate suit is sound, 6 and 1may well be adopted by the Court of Appeals when
the situation is presented. 7
The instant case has not altered the law of New York, as stated in the
Sterling case, in regard to the authority of an officer of a closely-held corporation to institute suit in its behalf. Because of the informal method of
conducting corporate affairs in close corporations, the facts of each case must
be closely scrutinized. Authority to bring suit will be implied where there is
complete managerial control exercised by the executive officer, as exemplified
by the instant case, or a prior course of conduct in instituting litigation. In
the absenqe of such control or such a prior course of conduct, there will be
no recognition of either presumptive or implied authority to institute suit.
Corporations-

Jurisdiction-

Doing Business".-Plaintiff, a North Caro-

lina resident, brought a libel action against defendant, a foreign corporation,
which had not qualified to do business in North Carolina, and which had

not designated anyone in that state to act as agent for service of process.
Service was made upon the Secretary of State pursuant to statute. Defendant
published and sold magazines in lots to independent newsdealers, who conducted their businesses in North Carolina completely free from control by
the defendant. The publications were delivered to a common carrier outside

the state, with legal title passing immediately upon delivery to the carrier.
Defendant also solicited subscriptions from without the state by mail and by

means of coupons attached to the magazines. For a year and a half prior to
this action, two sales representatives of defendant visited the newsdealers two
or three times a year. Another agent visited nine television stations approxl-

mately five times a year to promote publicity and arrange for advertising. No
exchange of money was involved. The trial court entered judgment quashing the attempted service of process and dismissed the action for want of
jurisdiction. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, held,
affirmed. Defendant's activities did not constitute the minimum contacts
necessary for a state to subject a foreign corporation to service of process.
Moreover, defehdant did not commit a tort within the state so as to give
North Carolina jurisdiction under the state statute. Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
"The proper function of juristic theory is to make for certainty and fore15. 1 A.D.2d 154, 157, 148 N.Y.S.2d 396, 399 (1st Dep't 1956).
16. See Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 120 N.J.L. 604, 1 A.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
See also Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 707 (1950).
17. This view was intimated in Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp.,
298 N.Y. at 493, 84 N.E.2d at 794 (1949).
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seeability of judicial decision, for simplicity and harmony of legal technique.... It can hardly be claimed that the traditional American theory of
foreign corporations has fulfilled this function."' This comment of Professor
Henderson, written forty years ago, applies with equal validity today. The
standards for judging a corporation's actions in a foreign state are as equally
ill-defined in 1957.2
Recent "doing business" decisions have been based upon the Supreme Court
decision in International Shoe Co. v. W1ashington.3 That decision substituted
the "fair play and substantial justice" theory for the "presence" theory.
The International Shoe case liberalized the prevailing view as to the nature
and extent of activities in a state which would make a foreign corporation
amenable to service of process. "Whether due process is satisfied must depend.. . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure."5 The administration of the laws would be fair
and orderly, the Court held, if the corporation had a minimum of contacts
within the state, and whether the minimum was met was to be judged by the
quality of the contacts.
The Court further defined the problem by showing the jurisdictional status
in four basic situations, namely:
First, if the activities are continuous and systematic, and give rise to the
alleged liability, then the state may validly assert jurisdiction.0
Second, if the activities are casual and isolated, but 7give rise to the alleged liability, then it would be fair to uphold jurisdiction.
Third, if the activities are continuous and systematic, but do not give rise
to the alleged liability, then jurisdiction will not be allowed, unless the activity is of such a nature, judged qualitatively, as to justify the assertion
of jurisdiction in keeping with the notions of fair play and justice.8
Fourth, if the activities are casual and isolated, and do not give rise to the
alleged liability, then jurisdiction is not upheldP
1. Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law.,

164 (191S).
2. In Erlanger Mlls, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956)
defendant's activities consisted in shipping goods f.o.b. his factory in pzrformance of a
contract made in New York to plaintiff in North Carolina. It was held that the state
had no right to subject the defendant to its jurisdiction on the basis of this single interstate shipment. In Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (0ka. 1954) the defendant's activities were of an identical nature with the one added fact that it sent an
agent into Oklahoma merely to investigate the faulty operation of a machine. This case
held that the state had jurisdiction over defendant.
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 86 (1918).
5.

326 U.S. at 319.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 317.
Id. at 318.
Ibid.
Id. at 317.

344
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Therefore, to insure that the requirements of due process have been met,
.. . the court looks not only to the regularity, continuity and extent
of the corporate activity within the state [the principal considerations in the
older cases], but similarly looks to the other two factors of great importance:
(1) whether the cause of action asserted resulted from the corporate activities within the state; and (Z) the closely related question of weighing convenience to the parties."' 0 The effect of the International Shoe case has been
to give a wider latitude to each state within which to hold a foreign corporation answerable for complaints against it.
In cases involving publishing corporations, it has been held that the corporation must have been performing one or more of its essential activities
within the state to be subject to service within the state." These activities
have been classified as: (1) gathering news and articles; (2) obtaining advertisers and subscribers as a source of revenue; and (3) printing and circulating its publication. 12 Under the first essential activity, the mere presence
of a reporter is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 13 There must be a duly
authorized agent who regularly gathers news within the state.' 4 As to the
second essential activity, the mere solicitation of advertising was not sufficient
to constitute doing business prior to the International Shoe case. 15 However,
in the recent case of Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co.,'0 where defendant employed eight travelling agents who regularly encouraged sales and checked on
the displays of their magazine within the state, it was held that such activity
". .. makes it reasonable to require the corporation to defend the suit in
Pennsylvania."'17 Jurisdiction was based on the theory that the Pennsylvania
Legislature intended that the courts would have jurisdiction over causes of
action arising out of activities Within the state if they were pursued for a
pecuniary benefit. It held also that the requirements of due process as found
in the International Shoe case were not violated. The third essential activity
was exemplified in Consolidated Cosmetics v. D.-A. Publishing Co.,' 8 where
the defendant was held subject to jurisdiction on the ground that its magazine was printed and mailed within the state.
In the instant case the defendant's activities within North Carolina in no
way involved the gathering of news and articles, or printing and circulation.
Its agent's activities were wholly within the scope of promotional work. The
court recognized the changes wrought by the International Shoe case, but
held that North Carolina could not assert jurisdiction, since these activities
were casual and isolated, and did not give rise to the alleged liability. The
10. 18 Fletcher, Encyclopedia of Corporation Law § 8713.1
11. Hunter v. The Afro-American Co., 133 F. Supp. 812
12. Id. at 815.
13. Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 62 F.2d 873 (D.C.
14. Hunter v. The Afro-American Co., 133 F. Supp. 812,
15. Cannon v. Time, Inc., 115 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1940).
16. 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
17. Id. at 107.
18. 186 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1951).

at 420 (1955).
(E.D.S.C. 1955).
Cir. 1932).
815 (C.D.S.C.

1953).
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court necessarily held the pertinent North Carolina statute to be unconstitutional, since it purported to give the state court jurisdiction, whether or not a
corporation was doing business within the state, when the cause of action
arose out of the distribution of goods by such corporation with the reasonable
expectation that the goods would be used within the state, and the goods were
so used, whether they are sold by an independent contractor or by an agent. 10
The court, however, specifically limited the decision on the constitutionality
of this statute to the set of facts in this case.
Plaintiff also claimed that the state had the right to assert jurisdiction on
the basis of another section of the same statute which purported to subject a
corporation to suit whether or not it was doing business within the state,
when the cause of action arose from a tort committed within the state.20 The
court avoided deciding the constitutionality of this section by holding that the
defendant had not committed the alleged libel within the state.
It is submitted that the court was correct in accepting the conclusion of
fact from the lower court, namely, that defendant's activities were not sufficient to justify the assertion of jurisdiction by North Carolina. The Jckints
case at present seems to mark the boundary between "doing busines" and
"not doing business" in the publishing field. The instant case seems to lie
beyond this limit. The agents of defendant in the instant case were not as
systematically and regularly employed. The distinction is a valid one.
But the court seems open to criticism on its second holding. It decided,
without citing an authority, that defendant committed no tort in North Carolina, since an independent contractor distributed the magazines. In effect it
held that, when a defamatory publication crosses into North Carolina no new
cause of action arises against the publisher. This is by no means a settled
question in the American courts. 2 ' The issue is a vital one in the case; for
if it had been held that plaintiff had a cause of action in North Carolina
against this defendant, then the state court would have had to exercise jurisdiction or declare the statute unconstitutional. Jurisdiction in the case of
torts arising out of the operation of automobiles by out-of-state drivers has
been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power because of the dangerous
nature of motor vehicles.2 2 Whether this or a similar reasoning will be extended to other torts is an unanswered question at present.2 3 This court failed
even to discuss the problem.
19. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-33.1(a)(3).
20. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-38.1(a)(4).
21. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Alich. L. Rev. 957, 1000 (1953).
22. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
23. The court answered in the affirmative in Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 132 F. Supp.
556 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
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Damages-Measure of under Robinson-Patman Act.-Plaintiff operated
a gasoline station, leased from the defendant oil company, from which it
purchased its gasoline. During two "gas wars" the defendant reduced its
selling price to its dealers, competing with one another, to enable them to
meet price competition of other brands, on the condition that its dealers drop
their retail prices to a level equal with those of neighboring dealers in rival
brands. During the first "war" some of the defendant's dealers competing
with the plaintiff received allowances which were greater than the plaintiff's.
During the second "war" the plaintiff, declining to drop its retail prices, neither
requested nor received any allowance, while the defendant's other dealers
competing with the plaintiff received allowances. Plaintiff sued for treble
damages for price discrimination under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. The district court held the measure of damages to be the largest price
differential for each period in which discriminatory prices were charged. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, judgment reversed and complaint dismissed. The price difference alone is not the measure of damages in a Robinson-Patman price discrimination suit, and actual
losses must be shown by other evidence. Enterprise Industries v. Texas Co.,
240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957).
The treble damage provision of the Robinson-Patman Act provides that
"any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . .shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained. . . ."' Does this mean that the discriminatory difference alone shall serve as the measure of damages? Two federal circuits have
given conflicting answers. The "general" damage rule, whereby the discriminatory difference in price, allowances, or services is the measure of damages,
was originally applied by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co. 2 In support of this liberal
view is a dictum in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co.3 Under this view, where the discrimination is proved, the
plaintiff is damaged, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, at least
in the amount of the discrimination, without the necessity of showing actual
loss as a result of the discrimination. The favoring of one buyer over another, the reasoning goes, burdens the latter with an expense that the favored
buyer need not bear and that such is a "direct business-damage." 4
1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1952).
2. 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945) (damages equal the difference between defendant's
salary payment for "demonstrator" of plaintiff's competitor and for "demonstrator" of
plaintiff).
3. 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947) (where, in answer to defendant buyer's argument that
unless he be allowed to disaffirm the sale on the ground of seller's price discrimination,
he would be without any other relief, the Court said: "If the prices are illegally discriminatory, petitioner has been damaged, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances,
at least in the amount of that discrimination.") (dictum). Accord, American Can Co.
v. Bruce's juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951) (price discrimination).
4. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir. 1945)
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The court in the instant case cited American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co.,0 a later case in the eighth circuit, as having apparently overruled
the Gus Blass decision. In the Russellville case, however, the court sanctioned
the rule of "general" damages as applied in usual situations, but concluded
the case fell within the "extraordinary circumstances" exception to the rule,
because the discrimination actually benefited the plaintiff.0 The plaintiff
was, therefore, left to recover only such losses as it could prove were the
result of the discrimination, without the aid of the "general" damage rule,
since the advantage the plaintiff received might have been great enough to
offset his losses.
The discriminatory difference was explicitly held not to be the proper measure of damages by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Sun Cosmetic Skoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp." The court considered the proper
measure of damages to be the actual reduction in profits directly resulting
from the defendant's discrimination.8
Assuming that the plaintiff in the instant case had established a violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act, the court, adhering to the rule of the Sun Cosvuetic case, an earlier case in the same circuit, declared that damages were not
a necessary inference from the discrimination. The actual loss of profits
suffered as a result of the defendant's wrongful act was the measure proposed by the court. The price difference could be relied on as the measure
of damages, where the disfavored party absorbed the extra charge, and did
not pass it on to his customers. For example, if the plaintiff had prevented
the diversion of his business to his competitors by selling at their prices,
thereby not passing the price difference on to his customers, it would have
suffered an actual reduction in profits measured by the extent of the price
difference.
(where the court pointed out that, had defendant not so discriminated, the cost of
the operation of plaintiff's business would have been reduced in the amount in which
the plaintiff's competitor had been favored by the defendant).
5. 191 F.2d 3S (Sth Cir. 1951).

6. Id. at 55 (where plaintiff complained not of being damaged as a result of the illegal change in freight rate basing point from one city to another, but rather that it was
not benefited to the same extent as some of its local competitors).
7. 178 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1949) (damages as a result of a discrimination in services
consist of loss to plaintiff's business or property through divers!on of plaintiff's customers

to its competitors).
8. Lack of precise proof of the amount of damage no longer blocks private recoveries in the federal courts. Generally today, once plaintiff demonstrates some injury, juries
may infer lost profits from past earning records of similar enterprises; the ue of inferential proof being justified on the theory of not permitting the wrongdoer to benefit
from the lack of uncertainty created because of his own deeds. Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946). Nevertheless, where the plaintiff's proof is
"purely speculative" and not the best evidence available, the courts will deny damages.
See Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70, 83-34 (7th Cir. 1950)
(damages based on accountant's own idea of reasonable returns with no basis in the
particular business, and no business books presented in evidence).
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In the absence of such evidence, the court insisted on other proof of actual
losses. This would have necessitated proof not only of the profits lost through
diversion of business to competitors, but also of plaintiff's gains realized by
charging a higher price, particularly on traffic respecting which there was no
competition. Failing to offer any evidence other than the discrimination, the
plaintiff proved no business loss, and recovery was accordingly denied.
It may be argued that the "general" damage rule, by eliminating the
necessity of proving damages with certainty, removes uncertainty from the
law. Nevertheless, by using such a measure of damages upon the mere showing of discrimination or inequality, a court fails to consider the language of
the statute, which requires injury to the plaintiff's "business or property,"
upon which it is necessary to predicate a private antitrust suit for treble
damages. 9 The effect of a discrimination on profits may be greater or less than
the discriminatory difference, depending on the demand in the industry. In
fact, such a measure of damages may bear no relation at all to actual loss.
Although a discriminatory difference may enhance the favored recipient's business position, those discriminated against suffer loss only to the extent that
the enhanced position impinges on their business, and often it does not. 10
Furthermore, the early proposed drafts of the Robinson-Patman Act contained
a specific provision allowing this measure of damages ". . . where the fact of
damage is shown, and in the absence of proof of greater damage .... ,)'m The
elimination of such provision is persuasive evidence that the discriminatory
12
difference was not intended to be, ipso facto, the measure of damages.'
The court's position in the instant case is, therefore, quite sound, particularly so in view of the fact that the failure to prove with certainty the amount
of damages will not bar recovery in the federal courts. 13 Moreover, even if
unable to show any damages as a result of the defendant's discrimination, a
plaintiff is not left without a remedy, since an injunction against continued
discrimination may be obtained.' 4
9. See note 1 supra.
10. E.g., compare American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th

Cir. 1951) (no actual -loss), with Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp.
985 (S.D. Fla. 1949) (actual loss).
11. S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 8 (1936). This proposed presumptive
rule for the measurement of damages was to act as a deterrent to violators and as a
means of enabling plaintiff to avoid the great difficulties of proving loss of business.
12. See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.
1945) (where one of the grounds upon which one of the judges dissented was that Congress expressly refused to sanction the "general" damage rule adopted by the majority).
See also Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private
Antitrust Suits, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 363, 407 (1954).
13. See note 8 supra.
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 (1952).
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Labor Relations - Power of States to Act 'Where NLRB Has Refused to
Exercise Jurisdiction.--Appellant, a manufacturer in Utah, shipped his products within and without the state. He also purchased, outside the state, materials worth approximately $50,000. The United Steelworkers of America,
certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the bargaining representative for appellant's employees, filed charges with the Board that the appellant
had engaged in unfair labor practices forbidden by the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRB declined to exercise jurisdiction, whereupon the union
filed charges with the Utah Labor Relations Board, pursuant to the state
act. The state Board's decision that appellant had engaged in unfair labor
practices was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Utah. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, two justices dissenting, reversed.
The states do not acquire the right to deal with matters over which the National Board has jurisdiction unless the Board expressly cedes such jurisdiction to the states. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
The National Labor Relations Act was passed for the stated purpose of
settling labor disputes which are detrimental to commerce, and gives the
NLRB jurisdiction over all labor-management controversies adversely affecting interstate and foreign commerce.' If a particular case is within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, then the exercise of that jurisdiction is within its discretion. 2 Because of time and monetary limitations, the NLRB has found it
necessary to hear only the most important cases within its jurisdiction.0 Do
state agencies acquire the right to exercise jurisdiction over those controversies which the NLRB chooses not to consider?
Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended in 1947,
gives the Board the right to cede jurisdiction by agreement with a state agency, provided the state statute is not inconsistent or had not received an inconsistent construction with the corresponding provisions of the NLRA In the
1. 29 U.S.CA. § 151-67 (1956).
2. See note 4 infra.
3. "From the beginning, budgetary limitations and other administrative considerations
have prevented the Board from exercising jurisdiction over all cases in which interstate
commerce was affected." Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Ed., 353 U.S. 1, 13 (1957)
(dissenting opinion). In 1954, the Board published standards regarding the exercise of

its jurisdiction and which made it clear that the Board would in its discretion handle
only cases involving large business concerns. 34 L.R.R.AM 75.
4. "The Board is empowered ... to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice . . . affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement,

law, or otherwise: Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency
of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any

industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except
where predominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable
to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding
provision of this subchapter or has received a construction inconsistent therewith." 29
U.S.C.A. § 160(a) (1956).
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instant case the court held that cession must be made expressly by the NLRB,
that a mere refusal to entertain a dispute does not activate state jurisdiction.
In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board,5
which gave rise to the amendment to section 10(a), the Court, in dicta, discussed the conflict of jurisdiction between the national and state boards. The
majority in the present case interpreted the language of the Bethlehem case
as expressing doubt as to ". . whether a state board could act either after a
formal cession by the National Board, or upon a declination of jurisdiction

."0 by the National Board. Because the amendment to section 10(a)

. .

made provision only for a "formal cession" of matters which the Board declines to consider, the majority argued that Congress intended to exclude
state action even where the NLRB had declined jurisdiction, if it had not
expressly ceded it to a state agency. According to the dissent, the sole doubt
in the Bethlehem case was whether the ".

. National Board lacked authority'

to cede jurisdiction over predominantly local labor matters by agreement with
state agencies, ' 7 and the purpose of the amendment to section 10(a) was
merely to remove this doubt.8
The majority pointed out that the NLRB was authorized to cede jurisdiction
tion:. .

"...

only where the state law is consistent with the national legislaThe Court implied that Congress, by imposing this condition on

the power of cession, expressed an intention that the state boards should not
indiscriminately be given jurisdiction over matters affecting interstate commerce, and therefore certainly did not intend any state agency to be automatically eligible to acquire jurisdiction over such matters merely upon the
refusal of the NLRB to exercise its powers.
It seems clear that the purpose behind the conditions imposed was to prevent decisions by state agencies which would be inconsistent with those of the
NLRB, and thus to avoid the development of conflicting systems of law
on labor-management relations. However, though the statute may accomplish
this purpose, it has also developed a "no-man's land" where the NLRB declines jurisdiction but can not cede it to a state agency.
In answer to this dilemma, the majority opinion made reference to a 1954
Senate bill' ° which recognized the existence of this "no-man's land," and which
would have empowered state boards to act where the NLRB refused to consider the matter and did not cede jurisdiction to state authority. The Court
pointed out that this bill was sent back to the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare for further study. The Court's implication was that Congress was aware of the problem and would have acted had it seen fit to do so.
The dissent found it difficult to believe that Congress intended a result
5. 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
6. 353 U.S. at 8.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. S.
(1954).

at 16.
at 17.
at 10.
Rep. No. 1211, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954); S. 2650, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
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which would bring about the existence of an extensive "no-man's land," in
which labor-management problems would go unsolved, and which would be
a ". . . step backward in the field of labor relations.""1 The Supreme Court
of California has summed up this view, stating: "when Congress enacted the
applicable statutes, it must have been aware that an unfair labor practice may
affect management and labor in a small business [one which would not have
sufficient effect on commerce to merit consideration by the board] to the same
extent as in a large industry.... Certainly Congress did not intend to deprive
a business having only a limited effect on interstate commerce of all protection
in a labor-management controversy." 2
Finally, the dissenting opinion asserted that the failure of Congress to
amend the proviso in the past was inconclusive, and that before state authority could be eliminated a clearly expressed congressional intent would be
necessary. Persuasive language from the Bethlehemn case was quoted: "to
construe federal legislation so as not heedlessly to forbid preexisting State
authority is to respect our federal system. Any indulgence in construction
should be in favor of the States, because Congress can speak with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full federal authority, completely
displacing the States."' 13 A reading of the proceedings which led to the recommission of the bill mentioned by the majority indicates that the merits of
the amendment were not thoroughly considered, and that Congress was not
fully aware of the consequences of not amending the proviso to section 10(a).14
Although the majority gave a reasonable interpretation to the governing
statute, the problem of the "no-man's land" remains unsolved. The Supreme
Court, having ruled that Congress has pre-empted the entire field of labormanagement relations affecting interstate commerce, has passed the dilemma
to Congress. Legislation seems imperative.
One possible solution would be for Congress to enlarge the Board, enabling
it to set up district boards throughout the nation with the central Board in
Washington acting as a reviewing body. However, the prohibitive cost of such
a system makes it unlikely that Congress would adopt this suggestion. Another possibility is that Congress might allow state courts to apply federal
law. The difficulty with this solution is that the very uniformity which Congress intended would probably not be attained because the state courts lack
the necessary procedural machinery to effectuate the Act.' 0 Unless Congress
11.

353 U.S. at 16.

12.

Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 45 Cal. 2d 657, 663, 291 P.2d 1, 5

(1956).
13. 330 U.S. at 780. A bill is now pending in both houses of Congress which would
provide that no federal law shall pre-empt state law in the same field unless there is an
express provision in the federal law to that effect, or there is hopeless conflict between
state and federal laws. S. 337, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H.R. 3, 8Sth Cong., Ist Se.
(1957); H.R. 513, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
14. 100 Cong. Rec. 6193-6203 (1954).
15. See Tobriner and Grodin, Taft-Hartley Pre-emption in the Area of NLRB Inaction, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 663, 679-SO (1956); 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1001, 1C03-04 (1956).
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decides that strict uniformity is not necessary, it is submitted that there can
be no adequate solution to the problem until all the state legislatures pass
statutes consistent with the national Act, and establish agencies to deal with
labor problems.16
Landlord and Tenant -

Covenant Not To Sublease or Assign -

Liability

of Landlord for Unreasonably Withholding Consent.-A tenant brought
an action for damages caused by the landlord's alleged breach of a covenant
in a lease. The covenant stated that the tenant would not sublet or assign
without first obtaining the landlord's written consent, and further stated that
such consent would not be unreasonably withheld. Upon a motion to dismiss
the complaint, the New York Supreme Court, held, denied. The clause stating that consent would not be unreasonably withheld was the landlord's covenant, and a breach thereof renders it liable in damages. Singer Serving Mac.
Co. v. Eastway Plaza, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 509, 158 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
In the absence of an express prohibitive covenant, a tenant has the right to
assign his lease or sublet the premises.' But where there is a clause in the
lease prohibiting assignment or subletting without the landlord's consent, then
such consent may be arbitrarily withheld with impunity. 2 However, such restrictions constitute 3a restraint against alienation and are strictly construed
against the landlord.
In the instant case, the lessee's covenant not to assign or sublet without
the lessor's consent had the added provision that such consent would not be
unreasonably withheld. The desired effect of this provision was to prevent the
lessor from arbitrarily refusing to consent to an alienation of the premises.
The problem before the court was to determine whether this provision in the
See also Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953), where the Court
stated: "Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by
any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted
tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and
hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. . .. A
multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law."
16. All but eleven states are without such agencies. See Lorenz, The Conflict of
Jurisdiction, 2 Lab. L.J. 887, 894 (1951).
1. 1130 President Street Corp. v. Bolton Realty Corp., 198 Misc. 198, 97 N.Y.S.2d
422 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Werber v. Weinstein, 207 Misc. 707, 138 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Munic.
Ct. 1955). See also Annot., 23 A.L.R. 135 (1923), supplemented in Annot., 70 A.L.R.
486 (1931).
2. Symonds v. Hurlbut, 208 App. Div. 147, 203 N.Y. Supp. 223 (1st Dep't 1924);
Boskowitz v. Cohn, 197 App. Div. 776, 189 N.Y. Supp. 419 (1st Dep't 1921); Ogden v.
Riverview Holding Corp., 134 Misc. 149, 234 N.Y. Supp. 678 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd, 226
App. Div. 882, 235,N.Y. Supp. 850 (1st Dep't 1929).
3. Costallat v. Diamond, 226 App. Div. 755, 234 N.Y. Supp. 152 (2d Dep't 1929).
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lease amounted to a covenant binding on the lessor, or whether it was a mere
qualification of the lessee's covenant not to assign or sublet. If it was the
former, then the lessor's arbitrary refusal to consent to an assignment would
constitute a breach of covenant.
This is not the prevailing view in New York 4 In Mann v. Steinbergu the
supreme court held that the provision stating that consent would not be unreasonably withheld was not a covenant of the lessor, but simply a qualification of the lessee's covenant not to assign. By arbitrarily refusing to give his
consent, the lessor merely released the lessee from his covenant not to assign.
The court said that several remedies other than damages, were available to
the lessee, namely: he could disregard the covenant and deal with the tenancy
as if no consent were required; 6 or he could bring an action for a declaratory
judgment to permit him to assign or sublease
These two remedies were
advanced by the defendant in the instant case in support of its contention
that plaintiff had no right to damages.
In the prior case of Butterick Publishing Co. v. Fulton & Em Leasing Co.8
the court, in referring to a substantially similar clause, said: "Under the clause
in the lease now under consideration, as a matter of law, the plaintiff, as lessee,
has no action at law for damages for breach of covenant by the landlord, as the
landlord never covenanted or agreed not to withhold his consent unreasonably."9 The court in the instant case, in taking the opposite view, relied upon
one New York case and several authorities from other jurisdictions.
In Broadway & 94th St., Inc. v. C. & L. Lunch Co.,10 the New York case,
the lease provided that the landlord had to consent in writing before the
tenant could make a valid assignment. However, the lease further provided
that it would be assignable if the tenant fulfilled certain conditions. The tenant complied with the conditions and assigned the lease on the condition that
if the landlord persisted in refusing to consent, the assignee would not be bound
by the assignment. The landlord refused to consent and the assignee vacated
the leasehold, demanding and receiving the consideration paid. From these
facts the court found a reciprocal obligation on the part of the landlord to
consent to the assignment, and held that good faith required the landlord's
recognition of the assignee whose name was submitted in accordance with lease.
4. The English view is in accord with New York. See Treloar v. Bigge, L.R. 9 Ex.151
(1874); Sear v. House Property & Inv. Soc'y, 16 Ch. D. 387 (ISSO); Goodwin v. Saturley, 16 T.L.R. 437 (1900). But see Lehmann v. McArthur, L.R. 3 Eq. 746 (IS67); Hyde
v. Warden, 3 Ex. D. 72 (CA. 1877).
5. 188 Misc. 652, 64 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
6. See Butterick Publishing Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.
Supp. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1928), adopting the remedy as suggested in Sear v. House Property
& Inv. Soc'y, 16 Ch. D. 387 (1880).

7. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 473.
8.

132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y. Supp. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1928).

See also Sarner v. Kantor, 123

Misc. 469, 205 N.Y. Supp. 760 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
9.

10.

132 Misc. at 368, 229 N.Y. Supp. at 89.

116 Misc. 440, 190 N.Y. Supp. 563 (Munic. Ct. 1921).
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Although this case was distinguishable on its facts, as it then stood it would
have provided a sound precedent for the holding in the instant case. However, the case was reversed by the appellate term." The court in the instant
case considered this reversal to be on other grounds. However, close scrutiny
indicates that the appellate term followed the traditional view, that is, the
tenant's compliance with the conditions in the lease merely operated as a
qualification of his covenant not to assign and not as a covenant on the part
of the landlord to consent. The court expressed the view that both landlord
and tenant ". . . had the mistaken idea that it was necessary to obtain the
consent of the landlord to such assignment,"'1 2 and went on to say that the
tenant could not blame the landlord for the type of contract he made with the
assignee. Thus the court indicated that the tenant, having fulfilled the conditions, was free to assign the lease, and it was his own misfortune that he
made the assignment contingent upon the landlord's consent.
In the Missouri case of Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co.,"a
the lease provided that the lessee could not sublet or assign without the consent
of the landlord. Thereafter the lessee and the lessor entered into a separate and
distinct agreement whereby the lessor agreed to consent to an assignment to an
acceptable assignee. The court, after finding consideration for the agreement,
held that the lessee had a cause of action against the lessor for the latter's
refusal to consent. This is quite different from the situation in the instant
case where the parties entered into no other agreement but the lease.
In the Washington case of Hedgecock v. Mendel,14 the lease provided that
consent to an assignment would not be arbitrarily withheld if the lessee presented a fit and proper person as assignee. The court recognized the traditional view and confessed ". . . that it would control here if the language in
the present lease contained only the words, 'this lease cannot be assigned
without the written consent of lessors, but such consent shall not be withheld
for any captious reasons.' ,15 These are substantially the words used in the
instant case. However, the court continued: "But it does not stop there, but
there immediately follows this clause, viz: 'But [consent] shall be given in
the event that the assignee presented as [sic] a fit and proper person ...with
financial resources . . . to render the lessors safe in so consenting.' The last
clause is an affirmative promise on the part of the lessors; it is a covenant."' 0
The court in the instant case also cited the Illinois case of Gelino v. Swan7
Me//1 in support of its holding. There the lease contained the proviso that
the lessee could assign or sublet provided the lessor was assured of the assignee's character and responsibility. The lessee proposed several assignees,
11. 119 Misc. 486, 196 N.Y. Supp. 549 (Sup. Ct., App. T.
Div. 807, 205 N.Y. Supp. 914 (1st Dep't 1924).
12. Id. at 488, 196 N.Y. Supp. at 550.
13.
14.

220 Mo. 522, 119 S.W. 400 (1909).
146 Wash. 404, 263 Pac. 593 (1928).

15.
16.
17.

Id. at 414, 263 Pac. at 597.
Ibid.
263 IH. App. 235 (1931).

1922),

aff'd,

210 App.
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all of whom were rejected. In his suit in equity the lessee sought, among
other remedies, enforcement of this provision in the lease. The court did not
express an opinion as to whether the provision was the lessor's covenant or
whether he was liable in damages. It simply declared that the lessor had no right
to refuse his consent under such circumstances. This is quite different from the
conclusion in the instant case, and very similar to the remedy proposed therein by the defendant lessor, namely, a declaratory judgment.
The only case relied upon by this court which does not lend itself to distinction is the New Jersey case of Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. J. J.
Hockenjos Co.'8 The Hockenjos case was apparently the first case to take the
view that the words "which consent shall not be unreasonably withhld"
spelled out a covenant binding on the lessor, so that an unreasonable refusal
would render him liable in damages.
Although the weight of authority is to the contrary. it is submitted that the
Hockenjos case and the instant case arrived at correct conclusions. If these
courts had followed the traditional view the lessee would not have been allowed damages or specific performance against the lessor, since in either case
the remedy would require that the clause in question be the landlord's covenant. It is doubtful whether the other forms of relief suggested by defendant
would provide the plaintiff with an adequate remedy. The time required to
obtain a declaratory judgment might well result in the loss of the prospective
assignee. If the lessee chose to assign the lease without the lessor's consent,
he would probably realize much difficulty in finding an assignee who would
take the assignment with neither the landlord's consent or a court order. If
an assignment were made, the lessee would be faced with the prospect of defending an action for breach of covenant, brought by the landlord.
It is further submitted that if, in any of the prior cases, the clause specified that the lessor covenanted not to withhold his consent unreasonably, no
court would have found difficulty in holding this to be the lessor's covenant,
and in granting damages for its breach. Yet when the clause has not specifically
stated that the lessor covenants, the courts have avoided the obvious implication,
and have held such a clause not to be the lessor's covenant, despite the fact
that its purpose was to prevent the lessor from arbitrarily withholding consent. The courts would do well, when faced with this situation, to heed the
words of Judge Cardozo: "[The law] .. .takes a broader view to-day. A
promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an
obligation,' imperfectly expressed."' 9
Mechanics7 Lien-Liability of Transferee of Trust Funds.-The plaintiff,
a materialman who furnished material to a contractor for the improvement
of real property, brought an action based upon the contractor's diversion to
the defendant of a trust fund created by statute for the plaintiff's benefit.
The contractor received payments from the owner of the property in install13. 132 N.J.L. 229, 39 A.2d S0 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
19. Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, US N.E. 214 (1917).
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ments, and transferred the proceeds of two installments to the defendant in
payment for an antecedent debt, at a time when the contractor owed the
plaintiff only $321.60. The plaintiff sought to recover $33,000, the amount
owed him by the contractor at the completion of the job. The trial court
allowed the plaintiff a recovery only of the claim outstanding as of the time
of the transfer to the defendant. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held, affirmed. Under section 36-a of the New York Lien Law,
a contractor's diversion to a third party of funds received for an improvement is subject to a trust for the benefit of subcontractors and materialmen
only to the amount of such claims as exist at the time of the transfer, and
not to the amount of future claims arising thereafter. Gramatan-Sullivan,
Inc. v. Koslow, 240 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1956).
In 1930, the New York Legislature passed section 36-a of the Lien Law,
which provided that the funds paid a contractor for real property improvements constituted a trust for the benefit of materialmen, laborers and other
specified beneficiaries.' The original section contained penal sanctions only, 2
providing for the prosecution of the contractor who breached the trust. In 1942
the legislature, on the recommendation of the New York Law Revision Commission, 3 added a civil remedy.4
Section 36-a, as amended, creates a statutory trust, differing from an ordinary trust in that the beneficiaries of the trust do not necessarily share pro
rata in the fund. The contractor has the right to pay beneficiaries' claims as
they ,mature, which may result in giving earlier claimants a preference to the
exclusion of later claimants. The contractor may also use the trust funds for
other purposes, provided he ultimately pays the claims of the beneficiaries.
In an action for breach of trust, therefore, the beneficiaries must not only
show a diversion of payments to purposes foreign to the trust, but also a failure to pay their claims when due. 5
Once a trust is breached, a transferee is liable if he has either actual or con1. "The funds received by a contractor from an owner for the improvement of real
property are hereby declared to constitute trust funds in the hands of such contractor
to be applied first to the payment of claims of subcontractors . . . and materialmen arising out of the improvement . . . and any contractor . . . who applies . . . such funds
for any other purpose and fails to pay the claims hereinbefore mentioned is guilty of
larceny. . . ." N.Y. Sess. Laws 1930, c. 859, § 36-a.
2. Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Federation Bank & Trust Co., 288 N.Y. 452, 43
N.E.2d 486 (1942); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Barr Wrecking Corp., 180 Misc, 200,
40 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
3. 1942 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report 325.
4. "Such trust may be enforced by civil action . . . by any person entitled to share
in the fund, whether or not he shall have filed . . . a notice of lien or shall have received a judgment for a claim arising out of the improvement. For the purpose of a
civil action only, the trust funds shall include the right of action upon an obligation for
moneys due or to become due to a contractor, as well as moneys actually received by
him." N.Y. Sess. Laws 1942, c. 808, § 36-a.
5. N.Y. Lien Law § 36-a.
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structive notice that the contractor has breached the trust.6 Third parties are
liable if they would have known of the breach had they made reasonable inquiry.7 The third party is also liable if, even without notice, he has not
given value for the transfer of the fund.8
Section 36-a left in doubt the time when the trust relationship arises. The
New York Court of Appeals, in Rayon2zd Concrete PiMe Co. v. Federation
Bank and Trust Co.,9 stated in a dictum that the trust did not necessarily
arise as soon as the contractor received the funds, but was conditioned upon
his failure to satisfy a claim. On the other hand, the New York Law Revision
Commission Report recognized the possibility of the existence of the trust
prior to the existence of a present claim. 10
In the instant case, the plaintiff contended: first, that immediately upon
receipt of the moneys by the contractor, a trust arose for the benefit of both
existing and future statutory claimants; and second, that defendant transferee
took subject to the trust because he had knowledge that the money transferred
to him was received by the contractor as payment for the property improvements.
The majority reasoned that no absolute trust arose at the time of original
payment to the contractor, since the latter could use the money for a purpose
foreign to the trust, provided he paid the claims of beneficiaries when
due with funds from other sources. The court cited the Rapnond case to the
effect that ". . . no trust arises .. . from the mere fact that the contractor
received and has in his hands moneys in payment on account of a public
improvement.""' L It may be inferred from this that plaintiff, in order to recover from a transferee, must show (1) a diversion of payments made to the
contractor, (2) at a time when there were existing claims, (3) that plaintiff's
6. "Mere knowledge of the source of the money is not sufficient; there must also be
knowledge of the violation of a trust duty. Actual knowledge is not necezzary. If the
recipients were put on notice, either actual or constructive, that is sufficient." Bonham
v. Coe, 249 App. Div. 428, 433, 292 N.Y. Supp. 423, 429 (1st Dep't), aft'd, 276 N.Y. 540,
12 N.E.2d 566 (1937). See Barclay v. Corn Exchange Bank & Trust Co., 267 N.Y. 630,
196 N.E. 614 (1935); Clarke v. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 259 N.Y. 285, IS1 N.E.
574 (1932); Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 21S N.Y. 105, 112 N.E. 759 (1916); Restatement, Trusts § 284 (1935).
7. Bonham v. Coe, 249 App. Div. 428, 292 N.Y. Supp. 423 (1st Dep't), afi'd, 276
N.Y. 540, 12 N.E.2d 566 (1937); Restatement, Trusts § 297 (1935).
S. Orthey v. Bogan, 226 N.Y. 234, 123 N.E. 4S7 (1919); Howells v. Hettrick, 163
N.Y. 308, 54 N.E. 677 (1899); Weaver v. Barden, 49 N.Y. 286 (1872); Restatement,
Trusts §§ 284, 304 (1935).
9. 288 N.Y. 452, 43 N.E.2d 4S6 (1942). See New York Trap Rock Corp. v. National
Bank, 260 App. Div. 1035, 24 N.YS.2d 426 (2d Dep't 1940). "It is equally apparent
that a trust cannot be created without a beneficiary. It nowhere appears that there are
any unpaid claims due to workmen or materialmen on account of the work done or material furnished to the contractor." Danischefsky v. Klein-Watson Co., 209 Vise. 210,
215, 244 N.W. 772, 774 (1932).
10. 1942 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report 325-26.
11. 28S N.Y. at 459, 43 N.E.2d at 4S9.
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claim is due and unpaid, and (4) that the transferee is not an innocent holder
for value.
The transferee in this case was a holder for value, 12 but the lower court
found as a matter of fact that he had constructive notice of existing claims,
since the circumstances suggested a financial emergency of which he could
not have failed to take notice.' 3 In rejecting plaintiff's contention that mere
knowledge of the source of the funds was sufficient to render the transferee
liable for future as well as existing claims, the court held that the transferee
had to have actual or constructive notice of the claims. 14 Since the future
claims were not yet in existence, knowledge of such claims was impossible.
The court declared that ". . . the validity of a payment by a contractor to a
third person must depend upon the situation as it exists when the payment
is received: that is, the payee does not hold it subject to a condition subsequent that the contractor shall pay at their maturity upon future claims as
they may arise as the work progresses. If invalid, it is invalid at once; any
other construction would make the section a trap for those who dealt with
the contractor."' 5
Chief Judge Clark, in dissenting, interpreted the majority view to mean
that each installment payment constituted a separate trust for claims arising
during the period covered by that trust. This, the dissent asserted, would require that the date of each installment be ascertained, as well as the time
when each claim arose. In Judge Clark's opinion, the administrative complexity of such a plan was enough to condemn it. However, a careful reading of the majority opinion shows that such was not their intention. According to the majority only one date had to be ascertained, that is, the date of
the transfer to the third party, and all claims existing at that time were
within the purview of the statute and any claims arising after the transfer were
not.
The dissenting opinion also cited the Law Revision Commission Report to
support the view that the trust applied to future as well as to existing claimants. The report stated: "It would seem that even if no such claimant existed
at the moment of receipt of the moneys by the contractor . . . a trust would
arise in favor of future claimants. . . ."16 The majority pointed out that
.. such a guarded statement was not a categorical ruling, but apparently
12. As a general rule, the cancellation of an antecedent debt is not value, so as to bar
the recovery of non-negotiable trust property by a beneficiary. Restatement, Trusts
§ 304(1) (1935). However, a transfer of trust property is for value when made in
consideration of the cancellation of an antecedent debt if the trust property Is a negotiable instrument or money. Stephens v. Board of Educ., 79 N.Y. 183 (1879); New
York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 206 App. Div. 490, 201 N.Y.
Supp. 529 (1st Dep't 1923); Restatement, Trusts § 304(2)(a) (1935). In an action under
§ 36-a the cancellation of an antecedent debt is always value, since the diverted trust Is
always money.

13.
14.

Gramatan-Sullivan Inc. v. Koslow, 143 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
See note 6 supra.

15.

240 F.2d at 527.

16.

1942 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report 325.
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tentative .... .,17 Moreover, it may only have been intended to cover the situation where the contractor retains possession of the payments until the future
claims do arise. In such a case the moneys would then constitute a trust for
the benefit of the subsequent claimants.
The holding in the instant case places no undue hardship upon future claimants, since they still have the common-law remedies,18 and may also protect
themselves by a prudent appraisal of the contractor's financial status before
giving credit. To hold otherwise would impose an intolerable burden upon
transferees, since they have no means of ascertaining the extent or amount
of future claims. The effect of such an interpretation would be to stifle most
business transactions between contractors and others. It is unlikely that the
legislature intended such a result. The court's holding, permitting the recovery of claims existing at the time of the transfer, and denying recovery as to
claims not in existence at that time, does substantial justice both to statutory
beneficiaries and to innocent transferees for value.
Military Law - Courts-Martial - Jurisdiction Over Offenses Committed
During a Prior Enlistment.-The accused was captured by the Chinese Communists during the Korean War. Upon release to the American forces, he was
returned to the United States and discharged, effective October 27, 1953. He
re-enlisted as of October 28, 1953, having been processed according to the
abbreviated procedure authorized for persons contemplating immediate reenlistment in the Army. In 1955 he was charged with various violations committed while a prisoner of war. The accused was convicted by a general courtmartial and sentenced to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures and life
imprisonment. The board of review ruled that because of the accused's intervening discharge, the court-martial was without jurisdiction and ordered the
charges dismissed. The Judge Advocate General of the Army certified this
question to the Court of Military Appeals. Held, reversed. Article 3(a),
Uniform Code of Military justice is constitutional when applied to discharged
servicemen who immediately re-enlist, and preserves to courts-martial jurisdiction to try such servicemen for offenses committed during a prior enlistment. United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
Military courts-martial have been granted limited jurisdiction over certain
classes of civilians by statute." The first class covers spies and allied offenders,2
a second included persons accompanying the armed forces when not subject
to the jurisdiction of the federal courts but a recent decision, the full import
of which is yet to be determined, has denied such authority to courts-martial
17. 240 F.2d at 525.
18. Friedman, Protecting the Equitable Lien of the Subcontractor and Materialmen,
136 N.Y.LJ. No. S4, p. 4 (Oct. 30, 1956); No. 85, p. 4 (Oct. 31, 1956).
1. Snedeker, Jurisdiction of Naval Courts Martial Over Civilians, 24 Notre Dame
Law. 490 (1949).
2. United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1920), cert.
denied, 256 U.S. 705 (1921); U.C.M.J. art. IS, 10 U.S.C.A. § 818 (1957).
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at least in capital cases. 3 The third class covers officers dismissed by the
President in time of war who demand trial, 4 and a fourth is composed of persons serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court-martial, although
dishonorably discharged. 5
The military, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 was also granted a continuing jurisdiction over discharged persons who
were subsequently charged with certain pecuniary frauds against the United
States; 7 but the draftsmen of the Uniform Code, recognizing that these offenders were subject to prosecution in the civilian criminal courts, omitted any
provision for this continuing jurisdiction.8 The military has also traditionally
reserved jurisdiction over discharged members of the armed forces subsequently
charged with having obtained their discharge by fraud. Prior to the Uniform
Code there was no specific statutory authority granting jurisdiction over such
persons. Rather it was based on the reasoning that, having obtained their discharge by fraud, it was therefore void with the effect that such violators were
still members of the armed forces. With the adoption of the Uniform Code,
the military was specifically granted jurisdiction of these cases.10
With the exceptions above noted, it had always been the rule that military
courts-martial lost all jurisdiction over discharged personnel even for offenses
committed prior to such discharge, and this even though the offender immediately re-enlisted. 11 In the absence of fraud, even a discharge issued by mistake by12 a duly authorized officer was sufficient to terminate military jurisdiction.
3. The Supreme Court originally upheld the constitutionality of U.C.M.J. art. 2(11),
11 U.S.C.A. § 802(11) (1957) in so far as it subjected dependents of service personnel
accompanying the military overseas, to trial by military courts-martial. Reid v. Covert,
351 U.S. 470 (1955). However, on reargument, the Court reversed its earlier decision,
holding that civilian dependents are not amenable to trial by court-martial. However,
the two concurring opinions indicate that the ruling may be limited to cases Involving
capital offenses. Reid v. Covert, 25 U.S.L. Week 4444 (U.S. June 10, 1957).
4. U.C.M.J. art. 4, 10 U.S.C.A. § 804 (1957).
5. Id. art. 2, 10 U.S.CA § 802 (1957).
6. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 800-940 (1957).
7. Arts. for Gov't of Navy art. 14, 34 U.S.C.A. § 1200 (1928); Arts. of War art. 94,
10 U.S.C.A. § 1566 (1927); Terry v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 1933);
Ex parte Joly, 290 Fed. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
8. U.C.M.J. art. 132, 10 U.S.C.A. § 932 (1957); United States ex rel. Flannery v.
Commanding General, 69 F. Supp. 661 (S.I.N.Y. 1946).
9. Snedeker, supra note 1, at 493.
10. U.C.M.J. art. 3(b), 10 U.S.C.A. § 803(b) (1957).
11. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); United States v.
Kelly, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 34 (1872); Mosher v. Hunter, 143 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1944).
Civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial over offenses punishable
both under the Criminal Code and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and may,
with the consent of the military or after taking jurisdiction first, try a member of the
armed forces for such offenses. However, since most civilian criminal statutes are
limited territorially this offers only a partial solution. Grafton v. United States, 206
U.S. 333 (1907); United States v. Canella, 63 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
12. United States v. Keating, 121 F. Supp. 477 (ND. Ill. 1949).
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In Hirshberg v. Cooke,1 3 however, the Navy, attempting to change this policy, subjected the accused to trial by a Navy court-martial for offenses committed while a prisoner of the Japanese. As in the instant case, the accused
had been discharged from the military service upon release as a prisoner of
war and had immediately re-enlisted. After this re-enlistment, the facts of
his maltreatment of fellow prisoners came to light, resulting in his trial and
conviction by court-martial. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the conviction was set aside, the Court ruling that there was no authority conferred on the Navy Department that could support or authorize this change
of position. The Court noted that since the Army had made no attempt to
change its policy in this regard, the two services, both deriving their authority
from the same source, would be enforcing two contrary policies on a delicate
and important issue. It was never intended, the Court concluded, that the
military services should enjoy such wide discretion on this vital matter1 4
With this decision in mind, the authors of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice included therein article 3(a), 115which it was hoped would vitiate the
effect of the Hirshberg case and permit the services to retain court-martial
jurisdiction over at least those discharged offenders charged with more serious
crimes committed while in the service.' The constitutionality of this article
was tested in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,'7 where the accused had
been finally discharged from the military service. Subsequently, the Air Force
uncovered evidence indicating that the accused had participated in the murder of a Korean national. The Air Force police arrested Toth and flew him
to Korea for trial by court-martial. The Supreme Court held that article 3(a),
in so far as it attempted to subject a civilian, discharged from the armed
forces, to trial by a military court was unconstitutional and ordered the petitioner's release. The Court, commenting on that provision of the Constitution which gives Congress the power to regulate the armed forces,18 said:
"That provision itself does not empower Congress to deprive people of trials
under the Bill of Rights safeguards, and we are not willing to hold that
power to circumvent those safeguards should be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause."' 9
13. 336 U.S. 210 (1949).
14. Id. at 219.
15. "(a) Subject to section 843 of this title (article 43), no person charged with
having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this chapter, an offense
against this chapter, punishable by confinement for five years or more and for which
the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or of a State, a Territory,
or the District of Columbia, may be relieved from amenability to trial by court-martial
by reason of the termination of that status.' U.C..JA.
art. 3(a), 10 US.C.A. § E03(a)
(1957).
16. H.R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949).
17. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).

18.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.

19.

350 U.S. 11, 21-22

(1955).
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The board of review in the instant
interpreted the Toth case as declaring article 3(a) void for all purposes. It thereby reaffirmed the rule of
Hirshberg v. Cooke,21 and accordingly ordered the charges dismissed against
the defendant. The Court of Military Appeals held that the Toth case was not
intended to be extended so far as to abrogate entirely article 3(a), finding
in the reasoning of the Court in that case language which it considered deliberately restricted its effect to cases where the accused had returned to
civilian life rather than re-enlisted. The Court emphasized language in the
Totlh decision such as "civilian ex-soldiers who have severed all relationships
with the military and its institutions. '22 Noting that the accused in the instant case was in no sense a civilian, notwithstanding the momentary hiatus
that had occurred, this court concluded that the Supreme Court could not
have intended to return men such as this accused to the ranks, perhaps to
serve beside the very men he had betrayed.
It is interesting to note that at the time Congress was considering article
3(a) many commentators, including Major General Green, then Judge Advocate General of the Army, doubted its constitutionality.2" It was then suggested that the most ready solution to the problem, both in the case of personnel who re-enlist as well as those who do not, would be for Congress to
effect legislation giving jurisdiction to the federal courts over persons formerly subject to the Uniform Code for acts, at least of a more heinous nature,
committed while so subject, without regard to the place where such act was
performed 2 4 It is true that such legislation would raise practical problems,
such as obtaining witnesses and evidence, but it is contended that these problems would be minor when contrasted with the effect to be achieved. It may
be that the present decision has offered a partial solution to the question,
but it is no answer to the more fundamental problem raised in the Toth case.
Instances where service personnel commit felonious crimes and then re-enlist
when there is opportunity to avoid prosecution by not doing so are few and
far between. Conversely, instances of such persons leaving the service entirely
2
are necessarily more common and therefore more in demand of solution. 6
20.
21.
22.

C.M. 386668, 21 C.M.R. 435 (1956).
336 U.S. 210 (1949).
350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955).

23.

Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080,

81st Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1949); 7 Vand. L. Rev. 145 (1953).

24. "Such a statute would be subject to no charge that the Congress was depriving a civilian of trial by jury in this country, or otherwise depriving him of due process
of law, since the trial would be by jury and the normal procedures of trial In the federal courts would be observed." Myers & Kaplan, Crime Without Punishment, 35 Geo.
L.J. 303, 327 (1947).
25. "There is, however, one outstanding problem for which a solution must be found.
It is based upon the firmly established rule that once a member -of the armed forces has

been discharged or otherwise separated from the service he is no longer subject to trial
by court-martial, even for offenses committed while he was in active service."
& Kaplan, supra note 24, at 313.
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CASE NOTES
Club Dues - Taxability of Assessments.-Plaintiff, a member-

ship corporation organized under New York law, collected an assessment
against its members to pay for repairs and improvements to club property.
Though such an assessment over and above regular dues is unenforceable by
the club under New York law, plaintiff also collected and paid over to the
Collector of Internal Revenue a 20 per cent tax on the assessment, in accordance with sections 1710 and 1712(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
which require such a tax on club dues. When its claim for refund of the tax
was rejected, plaintiff brought suit in the district court. Plaintiff appealed
from a denial of its motion for summary judgment and the granting of defendant's cross motion. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held,
affirmed. Section 1712(a), in defining "dues" as including "any assessment,
irrespective of the purpose for which made," was intended to encompass any
effective call for a definite contribution or payment from the members. City
Athletic Club v. United States, 242 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1957).
The New York courts have distinguished "dues" from "assessments.!"
Dues occur regularly, and are assumed obligations to pay for privileges to be
received in the future.2 Thus when one agrees to be a club member for a
year, he assumes the obligation of paying the year's dues. "Assessments," on
the other hand, are normally irregular, and are levied for the purpose of paying for expenses incurred by the club in the past.3 Once a member has assumed the obligation to pay dues, the club has a legally enforceable right to
collect those dues. There is no such right in regard to assessments. Section 20
of the New York Mlembership Corporation Law authorizes a membership corporation 4 to adopt by-laws regulating "the fees and dues of members and the
termination of membership on non-payment thereof or otherwise. . . ." Since
it makes no mention of assessments, the New York courts have consistently
held that membership corporations have no power to levy assessments
The
mere designation "assessment" does not render annual dues unenforceable,
but where an actual assessment is involved, then the levy is beyond the club's
power, and the by-laws may not be amended to provide such a power, even
1. Rainbow Falls Fish & Game Club v. Clute, 177 Misc. 71, 29 N.Y.S2d 94S (Sup.
Ct. 1941).
2. Thompson v. Wyandanch Club, 70 MIisc. 299, 127 N.Y. Supp. 195 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
3. Rainbow Falls Fish & Game Club v. Clute, 177 MiNc. 71, 29 N.Y.S.2d 94S (Sup.
Ct. 1941).
4. For a definition of a membership corporation see 7 White, New York Corporations
ff 19.02 (12th ed. 1947). See also In the Matter of Watson, 171 N.Y. 256, 63 N.E. 1109
(1902).
5. Thompson v. Wyandanch Club, 70 Misc. 299, 127 N.Y. Supp. 195 (Sup. CL 1911);
Kiowa Council v. Great Council, 132 Misc. 106, 228 N.Y. Supp. 256 (Sup. Ct. 1928); In
the Matter of Monroe Chapter, Order of Eastern Star, 132 Misc. 109, 228 N.Y. Supp.
248 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
6. Rainbow Falls Fish & Game Club v. Clute, 177 Misc. 71, 29 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup.
Ct. 1941).
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where all of the members agree to it.7 Thus, where an assessment has been
levied, the club cannot legally enforce it against delinquent members. Furthermore, should the club attempt to compel payment by suspension of membership rights or other coercive
measures, the delinquent member would be en8
titled to injunctive relief.
Section 1710(a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provides for
the imposition of "a tax equivalent to 20 per centum of any amount paid as
dues or membership fees to any social, athletic, or sporting club or organization, if the dues or fees of an active resident annual member are in excess of
$10 per year." Section 1712(a) defines dues as including "any assessment,
irrespective of the purpose for which made. . . ." The distinction between the
words "dues" and "assessment" made by the state courts has obviously not
been followed in the federal tax statute. But the question is whether, irrespective of this mere verbal formulation, the drafters intended to exclude from
the coverage of the tax statute assessments not legally enforceable by the
club against its members under state law.
A mere gift of money to the club would fall under the gift tax statute,
and would not be taxable as dues. So also a loan to the club would not be
dues within the meaning of the statute. 10 Where a club levies an assessment
which it has no legal right to enforce, it can be argued that this assessment,
if paid, constitutes no more than a gift from a member to the club, and may
not, therefore, be taxed as dues. This contention was upheld by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Garden City Golf Club v. Corwin," where
the court decided that payments made by the members in response to a "permissive assessment" were not dues within the meaning of the statute. The
court there distinguished between "obligatory payments" and "invited assessments," and held that the latter were not taxable under section 1710(a).
This distinction accords well with the doctrine previously laid down in
Weld v. Nichols,1 2 where, in deciding whether monthly, semi-annual or annual
golf fees were taxable as dues, the court defined dues as fixed and definite
charges applicable to all members of each particular class of membership.
This definition was expanded in Foran v. McLaughlin,13 which, in distinguishing but approving the Weld case, defined dues as a recurring, contractual
7.

In the Matter of Monroe Chapter, Order of Eastern Star, 132 Misc. 109, 228 N.Y.

Supp. 248 (Sup.

Ct. 1927).

8. Thompson v. Wyandanch Club, 70 Misc. 299, 127 N.Y. Supp. 195 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 1000-1030.
10. Rev. Rul. 55-576, 1955-2 Cune. Bull. 641.

11.

62 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1932). The decision has been followed in Fresh Meadow

Country Club v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 400 (E.D.N.Y. 1936), and Pendennis Club
v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 758 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
12. 9 F.2d 977 (D. Mass. 1925). This decision has been followed in Baltimore Country
Club v. United States, 7 F. Supp. 607 (D. Md. 1934); Williamson v. United States,

12 F. Supp. 26 (W.D.N.C. 1934); Philadelphia Cricket Club v. United States, 30 F. Supp.
141

13.

(E.D.

Pa. 1939).

59 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1932).
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obligation incidental to a class of membership, as distinguished from a single,
casual payment, such as the payment for a meal in the club dining room.
These decisions, based upon the idea that no levy could be included in the
category of "dues" unless the members were bound by a "fixed" or recurring
"contractual" obligation, may well have influenced the Garden City decision.
However, in 1942 the Supreme Court, in White v. Winclestcr Country
Club' 4 declared that the Weld doctrine was "intrinsically unsound." The
Court also expressly disapproved the Foran definition, holding that "... the
fundamental notion of club activity is that operating expenses are shared
without insistence upon equivalence between the proportion of an individual's
contributions and the proportion of the benefits he receives." 15 Thus the Supreme Court found that a levy designed to cover the operating expenses of a
club, paid in equally by all of the members of the club, falls within the
definition of dues, regardless of whether it recurs regularly or whether there
is a fixed and definite contractual obligation on the members to pay it.
While the White case and its companion case, Merion Cricket Club v. United
States,16 may have done away with the "recurring contractual obligation"
dogma, still they are not directly controlling of the question in the present
case. They do, however, seem to mark the turning of the tide. In 1952 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized that "moral force" may
constitute sufficient compulsion to take a nominally voluntary payment out
of the gift class and into the category of dues.1 7 In 1953 the Court of Claims
found that an assessment levied by a New York membership corporation was
dues within the meaning of the tax statute.18
Aside from this trend away from the rigidity of the old cases, the court in
the instant case had another strong reason for rejecting the Garden City holding: the fact that the application of the Garden City rule would lead to different results in different states, 19 depending on whether, according to state law,
assessments are or are not enforceable by membership corporations. It is
14. 315 U.S. 32 (1942).
15. Id. at 41.
16. 315 U.S. 42 (1942). These two cases were decided on the same day, the Court
having granted certiorari in order to resolve a conflict between the first and third circuits.

17. Ship Cabin Club v. Crenshaw, 199 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1952).
18. Century Country Club v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 727 (Ct. Cl. 1953). See Rev.
Rul. 55-533, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 642. In Century Country Club v. United States, the Court
of Claims based its decision on the belief that in authorizing the club inter alLa "to

stimulate an interest in outdoor sports ... and to perform any and all acts in anywise
appertaining to the specific objects hereinbefore set forth" the certificate of incorporation inferentially authorized the club to levy assessments if such were necezsary. This.
however, does not accord with N.Y. Membership Corp. Law § 20, which specifically
authorizes the adoption of by-laws regulating dues but does not authorize the adoption of by-laws regulating assessments. As interpreted by Thompson v. Wyandanch Club
and the cases following it, the statute simply does not permit a membership corporation to levy assessments. See 7 White, New York Corporations U 19.63 (12th cd. 1947).
19. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5261 (1949).
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axiomatic that, in dealing with tax statutes, "Congress establishes its own
criteria and the state law may control only when the federal taxing act by
express language or necessary implication makes its operation dependent upon
state law."' 20 The express language of this statute ("dues includes any assessment irrespective of the purpose for which made") surely does not make the
result depend upon state law, nor does it seem to be a logically necessary implication from the words of the statute that the taxability of an assessment,
levied under claim of right and 2paid
by the members, should depend upon
1
its enforceability under state law.
The lower court2 2 distinguished the Garden City case in that the assessment there was clearly labeled "permissive," and was therefore voluntary,
and not collected under a claim of right. In the present case, the assessment
was levied under a claim of right, being obligatory in form and understood
as such by both club and members, though in reality not enforceable by the
club and though the club made no attempt to enforce it by suspension of
membership rights or otherwise. The lower court further pointed out that in
the Garden City case the call for funds met with a rather weak response, while
here the assessment was complied with. In affirming, the Court of Appeals
held that the result reached by the lower court was "clearly correct," but indicated that it would be rid entirely of the Garden City rule, which made the
determination of a federal tax statute depend upon state law. Where a levy
is made and obeyed under a claim of right it should be taxable under the dues
statute "whether technically enforceable under state law or not." Even where
only sporadically obeyed, as in Garden City, a call for money for the equal
sharing of club expenses, coupled with the moral compulsion of group activity,
should be placed within the purview of the tax statute.
In its opinion in the Garden City case, the district court pointed out that if
the money involved had not been raised by assessment, an increase in dues
would have been the only course open to the club. The court pointed to the
danger that clubs in certain states would lower their dues and raise money by
"voluntary" assessments in order to avoid the effects of the dues tax. This is
still a valid line of reasoning. It seems quite likely that when Congress
20. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938) ; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932) ;
10A Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 61.09 (1948). Cf. United States v. Ogilvie
Hardware Co., 330 U.S. 709 (1947); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Freuler
v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
21. The tax is levied on the members, not the club. Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 1710(b). Therefore, the line of authority which holds that money received under a
claim of right, though unlawfully, is taxable if the recipient received ecoiomic value
therefrom, Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952); National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1938), has no application here. If the club is to sue It
must do so as agent, and must have filed written powers of attorney along with its
claim, within the period of the statute of limitations. Rev. Rul. 55-602, 1955-2 Cum.
Bull. 650; Turks Head Club v. Broderick, 166 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1948); Wild Wing
Lodge v. Blacklidge, 59 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1932).
22. 148 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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amended the original dues tax section to add the words, "The term 'dues'
includes any assessment, irrespective of the purpose for which made," it did
so with the intention of foreclosing just such an eventuality.
Wrongful Death Action -Tolling of Statute of Limitations on the Death
of the Wrongdoer.-Plaintiff's intestate died from injuries sustained as a
result of defendant's intestate's wrongdoing in August 1953. Defendant's
intestate died in October 1953. In an action for wrongful death brought some
thirty-two months after the death of the plaintiff's intestate, defendant set up
the two year statute of limitations contained in section 130 of the Decedent
Estate Law as a bar to the action. Plaintiff invoked the aid of section 21 of
the Civil Practice Act, which tolls the statute of limitations eighteen months
upon the death of the wrongdoer. The Supreme Court held defendant's defense to be insufficient in law. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held, affirmed. The provisions of section 21 of the Civil Practice
Act are applicable to an action brought under section 130 of the Decedent
Estate Law. McDonough v. Cestare, 3 A.D.2d 201, 159 N.Y.S.2d 616 (2d
Dep't 1957).
At common law no civil action could be brought for the death of a human
being resulting from the wrongful act of another.' Personal rights of action
died with the person, and the wrongful death created no new cause of action
in the victim's dependents for loss of services or support.2 Lord Campbell's
Act in 1846, the first step in abrogating the common law rule, provided for
an action for wrongful death "if brought within twelve months after his
death...

.

13

Following this model, statutes were adopted in virtually all the states. The
provisions of the various statutes differ widely in respect to persons entitled
to maintain such action,4 the persons for whose benefit the action may be
1. 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 333-36 (3d ed. 1927); Matter of Meng,
227 N.Y. 264, 125 N.E. 503 (1919).
2. Lord Ellenborough laid down this principle a century and a half ago in Baker v.
Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 180S), disalloving a husband's suit
for loss of wife's services resulting from her death, stating that a civil forum provided
no remedy. See Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. Rev.
431 (1916).
3. Lord Campbell's Act provided that whenever the death of any person was caused
by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another, in such manner as would have entitled the party injured to have maintained an action in respect thereof if death bad
not ensued, an action could be maintained if brought within tvelve months after his
death in the name of his executor or administrator for the benefit of certain relatives,
and that the jury could give such damages as they thought have resulted to the
respective persons for whose benefit the action was brought, and that the damages so
recovered, after deducting costs not recovered from defendant, should be divided among

beneficiaries in such shares as the jury by their verdict may direct. 9 & 10 VICL, c. 93.
4. While the provisions vary as to the proper party to bring the action, in most of the
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maintained, 5 the measure and elements of damages recoverable,0 the distribution of damages, 7 and the time for bringing the action. 8 These statutes,
commonly called "wrongful death statutes," are generally construed by the
various state courts as creating a new cause of action, 9 although there is authority to the effect that such statutes merely allow the action to survive. 10
In most states there is a special statutory limitation as to the time within
which an action for wrongful death must be brought, independent of the general statute of limitations. The majority of the states hold that since a wrongful death statute or a survival statute allowing damages creates a right of
action which did not exist at common law, or permits an action which abated
at common law to survive, the time limitation therein is technically not a
statute of limitations but is a condition to the right to maintain the action. 1
Under these decisions, when strict compliance is not observed as to the time
provision, the right arising under the statute expires, and is not merely suspended. Accordingly, the majority of states hold that circumstances which by
express provision or by implication toll the general statute of limitations will
states the bringing of the action is authorized by and in the name of the personal representatives of the deceased person. 16 Am. Jur., Death § 262 (1938).
5. While most statutes based on Lord Campbell's Act restrict the recovery to the benefit of kindred of deceased, some of them have departed from that Act and make recovery
either a part of the decedent's personal estate or part of such estate on failure of certain
specified kindred. See Hartley v. Hartley, 71 Kan. 691, 81 Pac. 505 (1905) (Iowa
statute); Ash v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 72 Md. 144, 19 AtI. 643 (1890) (W. Va. statute).
In some states, statutes have been enacted providing that suit shall inure for the benefit
of all parties concerned. Kelly v. Howard, 98 Miss. 543, 54 So. 10 (1911).
6. Annot., 74 A.L.R. 11 (1931).
7. Annot., 14 A.L.R. 516 (1921).
8. While New York sets a period of two years (Deced. Est. Law § 130), other states
permit a period of three years. Negaubauer v. Great Northern Ry., 92 Minn. 184, 99 N.W.
620 (1904) (Montana statute).
9. Gulf, Colorado, & S.F. Ry. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173 (1913); Bickford v. Furber,
271 Mass. 94, 170 N.E. 796 (1930); Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd., 214 N.Y. 101, 108
N.E. 217 (1915).
10. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N.E. 206 (1915), aff'd,
245 U.S. 632 (1917). In a few states, instead of the death act creating a new cause
of action, the legislature has adopted a statute, which, while in its features more nearly
resembling a survival statute, and construed by the courts of those states to be such,
yet partakes of the nature of a death act to the extent of allowing the recovery not only
of such damages as the injured person might have recovered had he survived, but also
damages for his death. Kling v. Torello, 87 Conn. 301, 87 Atl. 987 (1913); Romano v.
Capital City Brick & Pipe Co., 125 Iowa 591, 101 N.W. 437 (1904).
11. This view was enunciated in the famous Harrisburg case involving Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts statutes. The Supreme Court said: "The statutes create a new legal
liability, with the right to a suit for its enforcement, provided the suit Is brought within
twelve months, and not otherwise. The time within which the suit must be brought
operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone."
The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886). Accord, Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257
U.S. 233 (1921); Lapsley v. Public Service Corp., 76 N.J.L. 169, 68 Adt. 1113 (Sup.
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not toll the limitation period in a "wrongful death statute," in the absence of

a saving clause to that effect.'The enactment in 1847 of the wrongful death statute in New York was the

first such statute in the United States. 13 The statute contained the following
provision: ". . . provided that every such action shall be commenced within
two years after the death of such deceased person" 14 In 1880 this death

statute, including the specific time limitation, was transferred by the legisla-

ture into the Code of Civil Procedure, exclusive of the words "provided

that." 15 In 1894 such a cause of action was made a constitutional guarantee

by its adoption into the New York State Constitution.10 Until 1915, the
courts of New York followed the majority rule in construing the time limitation in the wrongful death statute as a condition affecting the right to sue and
17
not as a statute of limitations.
In 1915 the Court of Appeals, in Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd.,18 held that
with respect to the rules of pleading, the time limitation was not a condition
upon the right to sue but was a statute of limitations. The incorporation of
the entire death statute into the Decedent Estate Law in 1920o had no effect
on this decision, and it has since been clearly established as the law of New
Ct. 1908); Peters v. Public Service Corp., 132 N.J. Eq. 500, 29 A.2d IS9 (Ch. 1942).
In the Peters case, while upholding the rule that the commencement of the action within
the time limit is an indispensable condition of lialbilit.v under the wrongful death statute,
the court held that equity will not permit the defendant to take advantage of the bar
where the defendant's wrongful conduct causes plaintiff to delay subjecting his claim to the
bar. Contra, Bement v. Grand Rapids & I. Ry., 194 Mich. 64, 160 N.W. 424 (1916); ze
Annot., 67 A.L.R. 1070 (1930).
12. Ibid.; in Bickford v. Furber, 271 Mass. 94, 170 N.E. 796 (1930), the court held
that the time for commencing an action for wrongful death is not extended by the fact
that because of the death of the wrongdoer within the time limited for bringing the
action, there was no executor or administrator of his estate for a part of that time;
Weiss v. Baviello, 133 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (New Yorl: court applying Connecticut law); McKinney v. Schuster, 202 Misc. 450, 110 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1952)

(involving Virginia statute).
13. 16 Am. Jur., Death § 49 (1938).
14. N.Y. Sess. Law 1S47, c. 450 §§ 1-3. (Emphasis added.)
15. N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 1902-05.
16. N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 18 (1S94), now, N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 16 (1933).
17. See Pernisi v. John Schmolz' Sons, 142 App. Div. 53, 126 N.Y. Supp. &10 (2d
Dep't 1910); Colell v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 80 App. Div. 342, S0 N.Y. Supp. 675 (2d
Dep't 1903).
18. 214 N.Y. 101, lOS N.E. 217 (1915).
19. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 130. The statute provides: "The executor or administrator duly appointed in this state, or in any other state, . . . of a decedent who has
left him or her surviving a husband, wife or next of kin, may maintain an action to
recover damages for a wrongful act . . . by which the decedent's death was caused,
against a natural person who, or a corporation which, would have been liable to an
action in favor of the decedent by reason thereof if death had not ensued. Such an action
must be commenced within two years after the decedent's death."
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York in repeated opinions. 20 The rule of the Sharrow case rested upon the
omission of the words "provided that" when the legislature transferred the
death statute into the Code of Civil Procedure in 1880. In the Sharrow case,
Chief Judge Bartlett, speaking for the majority, said: "I cannot agree that
this constitutes a mere change of language without any change in meaning or
effect. .. . I think there were reasons which might well have influenced the
legislature to make a change in the law in this respect. The right of action
to recover damages for wrongfully causing death . . . has since been made a
constitutional right. . . . No good reason existed why the benefit of the
general exceptions given by law to the parties against whom the bar of the
Statute of Limitations is invoked should not be given to plaintiffs in this
class of cases; and it seems to me that it is not going too far to suppose that
this consideration may have led to the alteration in the language of the
2
statute." 1
In accordance with the rule of the Skarrow case, it has been held that certain provisions of the Civil Practice Act, which apply generally to the limitation of actions, other than those which prescribe the period for the commencement of an action, apply to an action for wrongful death. 22 Moreover,
it has been held that applying section 19 of the Civil Practice Act in the case
of the defendant's absence from the state saves the action from the bar of the
statute of limitations where the action2 was not commenced within two years
from the death of plaintiff's intestpte. 8
However, as the court points out, the general provisions of article 2 of the
Civil Practice Act as to tolling of the period of limitations have been held
not to apply where they are deemed inconsistent with the special limitations
20. In Streeter v. Graham & Norton Co., 263 N.Y. 39, 188 N.E. 150 (1933), involving the problem whether the provisions in the N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 23, formerly § 405 of
the N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc., authorizing a new action after a prior failure otherwise on its
merits, tolled the limitation period in the death statute embodied in the N.Y. Deced. Est.
Law § 130, formerly § 1902 of the N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc., the court, citing the Sharrow
case as still the law allowed § 23 to apply. See also Kerr v. St. Lukes Hospital, 287 N.Y.
673, 39 N.E.2d 291 (1941) ; Crapo v. Syracuse, 183 N.Y. 395, 76 N.E. 465 (1906) ; Schwertfeger v. Scandinavian Am. Line, 186 App. Div. 89, 174 N.Y. Supp. 147 (1st Dep't 1919),
aff'd without opinion, 226 N.Y. 696, 123 N.E. 888 (1919); Hoffman v. Delaware &
Hudson Co., 163 App. Div. 50, 148 N.Y. Supp. 509 (3d Dep't 1914) (held, § 405 of the
N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc., which grants under certain conditions the right to bring a
new action within one year, although the statute of limitations on the original cause of
action has expired, applies to a death action) ; Haas v. New York Post Graduate Medical
School & Hospital, 131 Misc. 395, 226 N.Y. Supp. 617 (Sup. Ct. 1928); also, Rock
Island Coal Mining Co. v. Allen, 106 Okla. 188, 233 Pac. 1060 (1924).
21. 214 N.Y. at 105, 108 N.E. at 218.
22. Kerr v. St. Luke's Hospital, 287 N.Y. 673, 39 N.E.2d 291 (1941) (held, where a
summons was delivered within two years to the sheriff for service but was not actually
served until after the two year period, the death action was commenced in time); Streeter
v. Graham & Norton Co., 263 N.Y. 39, 188 N.E. 150 (1933).
23. Philips v. Apuzzo, 266 N.Y. 579, 195 N.E. 208 (1935); Neuman v. Feinsinger, 101
N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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under the death statute of section 130. Thus, in Jones v. 416 Pleasant Ave.
Holding Corp.,24 it was held that section 11 of article 2 of the Civil Practice
Act, which provides that the periods of limitation of article 2 run from the
time when the right to relief by action accrues, does not apply to an action
under section 130 of the Decedent Estate Law because, although the right to
relief by action in a wrongful death action accrues upon the appointment of
an executor or administrator, section 130 specifically provides that the time
limitation shall run from the time of the decedent's death.
There appears no inconsistency between the specific statute (section 130 of
the Decedent Estate Law) which makes no mention of any disabilities for tolling the time limitation, and the general statute (article 2 of the Civil Practice Act) which does so provide. Absent any inconsistency, it is felt that
the court was clearly correct in finding no distinction between the present
case and the prior cases in which the beneficial provisions of the general
statute were held applicable to an action under section 130 of the Decedent
Estate Law.
24. 276 App. Div. 842, 93 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd mem., 304 N.Y. 893,
110 N.E.2d 502 (1953). See also, Cobb v. Janoff, 133 N.YS2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1954). The

more liberal statute of limitations contained in the N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act with r,-pect to
injuries caused in violation of the N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law is not available in a death action
since the statute bringing such action into existence contains its own statute of limitations.

